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Abstract: In this paper we present the Subtraction Algorithm that com-
putes for every classical minimum cost spanning tree game a population
monotonic allocation scheme. As a basis for this algorithm serves a decom-
position theorem that shows that every minimum cost spanning tree game
can be written as nonnegative combination of minimum cost spanning tree
games corresponding to 0-1 cost functions. It turns out that the Subtrac-
tion Algorithm is closely related to the famous algorithm of Kruskal for the
determination of minimum cost spanning trees. For variants of the classical
minimum cost spanning tree games we show that population monotonic al-
location schemes do not necessarily exist.
Key-words: Minimum cost spanning tree games, population monotonic al-
location schemes.
1 Introduction
The objective in minimum cost spanning tree problems is the construction
of a network of minimal cost which provides for every node in the network
a connection with the source. Examples of minimum cost spanning tree
problems are the problem of building a network of computers that connects
every computer with some server or the problem of building a drainage
system that connects every house in a city with the water purifier.
Another example of a minimum cost spanning tree problem is the prob-
lem of carpooling. Suppose that three employees of a firm consider the
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possibility of carpooling in order to reduce their daily travel cost. The cost
of driving a car from one employee to another or from one employee to the




























Figure 1: The cost of driving and a minimum spanning tree.
the firm by 0. A minimum cost spanning tree in this network is {01, 12, 13}
with cost 18. This tree corresponds to the plan of carpooling in which em-
ployees 2 and 3 drive their car in solitude to employee 1 where all employees
take one car in order to drive together to the firm.
Having solved the problem of finding a minimum cost spanning tree the
employees are confronted with the problem of how to divide the cost of 18
among the employees in a fair way. At this stage cooperative game theory
enters the scene. The employees consider the minimum cost spanning tree
game (N, c) (Bird (1976)), where N = {1, 2, 3} and c : 2N\{∅} → IR is the
characteristic function which computes for every S ∈ 2N\{∅} the cost c(S)
of a network of minimal cost connecting every employee in S with the firm.
So c(123) = 18 and, e.g., c(23) = 15 since {02, 23} is a minimum spanning
tree for S = {2, 3}. One way of dividing the joint costs c(N) in a fair way
is by means of a core allocation (Gillies (1953)), which is a vector (xi)i∈N
that is efficient, i.e.
∑
i∈N xi = c(N), and gives no subgroup an incentive to
deviate, i.e.
∑
i∈S xi ≤ c(S) for every S ∈ 2
N\{∅}. Bird (1976) showed how
to compute a core element of a minimum cost spanning tree game. First one
has to find a minimum spanning tree by means of Prim’s Algorithm (Prim
(1957)), which forms in every step of the algorithm an edge between a node
which is not connected yet with the source and the source or a node which is
already connected with the source. Secondly the Bird rule assigns the cost
of an edge which forms in some step of the algorithm to the node which gets
a connection with the source in that same step. In the example of figure 1
Prim’s Algorithm first forms edge 01, then 12, and finally 13 and the Bird
rule yields the core allocation x = (7, 5, 6).
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Suppose now that a fourth employee is asking whether he can join the
carpoolers 1, 2, and 3. The cost of driving from employee 4 to the other
employees and to the firm are given in figure 2, as well as a minimum




















































Figure 2: The cost of driving and a minimum spanning tree in the new
situation.
situation yields the allocation x = (5, 6, 6, 3). In the new situation employee
2 has to pay 6, whereas in the old situation he only paid 5. Therefore, if the
employees use the Bird rule in order to divide joint costs, employee 2 will
veto the entrance of employee 4.
The central question in this paper is whether every minimum cost span-
ning tree game has a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) (Spru-
mont (1990)), which is an allocation scheme that provides a core element for
the game and all its subgames and which, moreover, satisfies a monotonic-
ity condition in the sense that players have to pay less in larger coalitions.
We will answer this question in the affirmative and we will provide the
Subtraction Algorithm, that computes for every minimum cost spanning
tree game a pmas. We will show that this algorithm is closely related to
Kruskal’s algorithm for finding a minimum spanning tree (Kruskal (1956)).
The Subtraction Algorithm is based upon a decomposition theorem, which
shows that every minimum cost spanning tree game can be written as a non-
negative combination of minimum cost spanning tree games with 0-1 cost
functions. Another approach has been followed by Kent and Skorin-Kapov
(1996). They established the existence of a pmas for minimum cost span-
ning tree games by considering the dual of the LP-problem, corresponding
to the problem of finding a minimum spanning tree for the grand coalition.
This paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries are introduced in
section 2. In section 3 the decomposition theorem is provided and section 4
focuses on minimum cost spanning tree games with 0-1 cost functions. The
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Subtraction Algorithm is presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes with
examples that show that variants of the classical minimum cost spanning
tree games do not necessarily have a pmas.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some terminology on graphs and cooperative
games.
A complete weighted graph is a tuple < N ′, w > where
i) N ′ = {0, 1, . . . , n};
ii) w : E → IR+, where E = {S : S ⊆ N
′, |S|= 2}.
Elements of N ′ are called nodes. Node 0 is called the source and N =
{1, . . . , n} the set of players. Elements of E are called edges and for an
l ∈ E the nonnegative number w(l) represents the weight or cost of edge l.
If w(l) ∈ {0, 1} for every l ∈ E the cost function w is called simple. The
carrier Ca(w) of w is the set of edges with positive cost, i.e. Ca(w) = {l ∈
E : w(l) > 0}. A subset Γ of E is called a network. The cost of network
Γ is w(Γ) =
∑
l∈Γw(l). A path from i to j in Γ is a sequence of nodes
i = i0, i1, . . . , ik = j such that {is, is+1} ∈ Γ for every s ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}. A
network Γ is a spanning network for S (S ⊆ N) if for every l ∈ Γ we have
l ⊆ S ∪ {0} and if for every i ∈ S there is a path in Γ from i to 0.
A cooperative (cost) game is a tuple (N, c) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the
set of players and c : 2N\{∅} → IR its characteristic (cost) function. A
population monotonic allocation scheme or pmas (Sprumont (1990)) of the




xS,i = c(S) for all S ∈ 2
N\{∅};
ii) xS,i ≥ xT,i for all S, T ∈ 2
N\{∅} and i ∈ N with i ∈ S ⊂ T .
A pmas provides a cost allocation vector for every coalition in a monotonic
way, i.e. the cost allocated to some player decreases if the coalition to which
he belongs becomes larger.
3 Minimum cost spanning tree games
The main aim of this section is to provide a decomposition theorem for
minimum cost spanning tree games: every minimum cost spanning tree
4
game is a nonnegative combination of minimum cost spanning tree games
which correspond to simple cost functions. First we recall the definition of
minimum cost spanning tree games (see Bird (1976)).
Definition 1 Let < N ′, w > be a complete weighted graph. The minimum
cost spanning tree (mcst) game (N, c), corresponding to< N ′, w >, is defined
by
c(S) = min{w(Γ) : Γ is a spanning network for S}
for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
In a mcst game the number c(S) is the cost of a cheapest network, which
connects every member of S with the source and which uses only edges in
S∪{0}. Always a cheapest network without cycles, i.e. a tree, can be chosen.
Example 1 Consider the complete weighted graph < N ′, w > with N ′ =




























Figure 3: The cost function of Example 1.
minimum cost spanning network for S is Γ = {02, 03} with cost 13, whereas
a minimum cost spanning network for N is Γ = {01, 12, 13} with cost 12.
Proceding in this way we find that the mcst game (N, c), corresponding to
< N ′, w >, is given by
c(123) = 12,
c(12) = 5, c(13) = 8, c(23) = 13,
c(1) = 1, c(2) = 5, c(3) = 8.
If no confusion can occur about the set of nodes N ′ = {0, 1, . . . , n} and
hence about the set of players N = {1, . . . , n} we will denote the complete
weighted graph < N ′, w > shortly by its cost function w and the mcst game
(N, c) by its characteristic function c. If the cost of all edges in Ca(w)
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are lowered by the cost of an edge in Ca(w) with minimal cost we are left
with a cost function with smaller carrier. The following lemma establishes
a relation between the corresponding mcst games.
Lemma 1 Let w be a cost function with Ca(w) = ∅ and let α := min{w(l) :
l ∈ Ca(w)}. Let w′ be the simple cost function defined by w′(l) := 1 if
l ∈ Ca(w) and w′(l) := 0 otherwise. Let w′′ be the cost function defined
by w′′(l) := w(l) − αw′(l) for every l ∈ E. Finally, let c, c′ and c′′ be
the mcst games corresponding to w, w′ and w′′ respectively. Then we have
w = αw′ +w′′ and c = αc′ + c′′.
Proof It follows by definition that w = αw′ + w′′. In order to prove
that c = αc′ + c′′, i.e. c(S) = αc′(S) + c′′(S) for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}, let
S ∈ 2N\{∅}. Let Γ′ be a minimum cost spanning network for S in w′
without cycles, i.e. Γ′ is a minimum cost spanning tree for S in w′. Write
Γ′ = L0 ∪L1 where L0 := {l ∈ Γ′ : w′(l) = 0} and L1 := {l ∈ Γ′ : w′(l) = 1}.
Clearly, |Γ′| = |L0|+ |L1|. Since Γ′ is a tree we also have |Γ′| = |S|. Hence
c′(S) = w′(Γ′) = |L1| = |S| − |L0|.
It suffices to show that there exists a minimum cost spanning tree Γ′′ for S
in w′′ with L0 ⊆ Γ′′. Since then Γ′′ contains at most |Γ′′\L0| = |S| − |L0|
edges in Ca(w′) and hence w′(Γ′′) ≤ |S| − |L0| = w′(Γ′). Therefore Γ′′ is
also a minimum cost spanning tree for S in w′. Having w = αw′ + w′′ and
the fact that Γ′′ is a minimum cost spanning tree for S in both w′ and w′′
we may conclude that Γ′′ is also a minimum cost spanning tree for S in w.
So, c(S) = w(Γ′′) = αw′(Γ′′) +w′′(Γ′′) = αc′(S) + c′′(S).
In order to show that there is a minimum cost spanning tree Γ′′ for S in w′′
with L0 ⊆ Γ′′ take an arbitrary minimum cost spanning tree Γ for S in w′′.
If L0 ⊆ Γ we are done. If L0 ⊆ Γ choose an l ∈ L0\Γ. Since Γ∪{l} contains
a cycle C, whereas Γ′, and hence L0, do not contain cycles, we can find an
edge l′ ∈ C with l′ /∈ L0. Define Γ̃ := (Γ ∪ {l})\{l′}. Since w′′(l) = 0 and
w′′(l′) ≥ 0 we find that also Γ̃ is a minimum cost spanning tree for S in w′′.
Moreover |Γ̃ ∩ L0| = |Γ ∩ L0| + 1. Repeating this argument results in the
tree Γ′′ with the desired properties.
Now we are able to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 1 Let w be a cost function with Ca(w) = ∅ and let c be the cor-
responding mcst game. Then there exists a sequence of simple cost functions
w1, . . . , wk, with Ca(w) = Ca(w1) ) Ca(w2) ) · · · ) Ca(wk), and positive
6











Proof The proof is by induction to |Ca(w)|.
If |Ca(w)| = 1 then Ca(w) has a unique element, say l∗. Defining α := w(l∗)
and the simple cost function w1 by w1(l
∗) := 1 and w1(l) := 0 if l = l∗ we
clearly have w = α1w1. Moreover, if c1 is the mcst game corresponding to
w1 one easily verifies that c = α1c1.
Now let m ∈ IN,m ≥ 2 and suppose that the theorem has been proved for
every cost function w with |Ca(w)| ≤ m−1. Consider a cost function w with
|Ca(w)| = m. According to Lemma 1 there is a simple cost function w1,
namely the simple cost function with same carrier as w, a positive number
α1 and a cost function w
′′ with Ca(w′′) ( Ca(w) such that w = α1w1+w
′′.
Moreover, if c1 and c
′′ are the mcst games corresponding to w1 and w
′′
respectively we have c = α1c1+ c
′′. Application of the induction hypothesis
to w′′ finishes the proof.
Example 2 Consider the cost function w and corresponding mcst game c
of Example 1. Application of Theorem 1 yields
w = α1w1 + α2w2 + α3w3 + α4w4 + α5w5 + α6w6
where α1 = 1, α2 = 3, α3 = 1, α4 = 2, α5 = 1 and α6 = 2, and the simple
cost functions w1, . . . , w6 are specified by
edge l 01 02 03 12 13 23
w1(l) 1 1 1 1 1 1
w2(l) 0 1 1 1 1 1
w3(l) 0 1 1 0 1 1
w4(l) 0 0 1 0 1 1
w5(l) 0 0 1 0 0 1
w6(l) 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Computing the mcst games c1, . . . , c6 corresponding to w1, . . . , w6 respec-
tively we get
coalition S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
c1(S) 1 1 1 2 2 2 3
c2(S) 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
c3(S) 0 1 1 0 1 2 1
c4(S) 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
c5(S) 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
c6(S) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
One easily verifies that
∑6
i=1 αici coincides with the mcst game c, as com-
puted in Example 1.
4 Simple cost functions
In this section we will focus on simple cost functions. We will show that a
mcst game corresponding to a simple cost function has a population mono-
tonic allocation scheme. Using Theorem 1 we obtain as a corollary that
every mcst game has a population monotonic allocation scheme.
Let w be a simple cost function and let S ∈ 2N\{∅} be a coalition.
Two nodes i and j in S ∪ {0} are (w, S)-connected if there exists a sequence
of nodes i = i0, . . . , ik = j in S ∪ {0} with w({is, is+1}) = 0 for every
s ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. A (w, S)-component of S ∪ {0} is a maximal subset
of S ∪ {0} with the property that any two nodes in this subset are (w, S)-
connected. The number of (w, S)-components is denoted by n(w, S). Clearly
the collection of (w, S)-components form a partition of S ∪ {0}.
Lemma 2 Let w be a simple cost function and let c be the corresponding
mcst game. Then we have
c(S) = n(w, S)− 1
for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
Proof Let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. If n(w, S) = 1 then S ∪ {0} is the unique (w, S)-
component. Therefore Γ = {l ∈ E : l ⊆ S ∪ {0}, w(l) = 0} is a spanning
network for S with w(Γ) = 0. Hence c(S) = 0 = n(w, S)− 1.
Now suppose n(w, S) ≥ 2. Let C0, C1, . . . , Ck (k ≥ 1) be all (w, S)-compo-
nents. Clearly S ∪ {0} = ∪ki=0Ci and n(w, S) = k + 1. Without loss of
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generality we may assume that 0 ∈ C0. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} select some
node ni ∈ Ci. Consider the network
Γ = {l ∈ E : l ⊆ S ∪ {0}, w(l) = 0} ∪ {{ni, 0} : i ∈ {1, . . . , k}}.
The network Γ is a spanning network for S: nodes in C0 are connected with
source 0 via edges in Γ of zero cost, nodes in Ci with i ∈ {1, . . . , k} are
connected with the source via node ni. Moreover w(Γ) = k. It suffices to
show that for any spanning tree Γ′ for S we have w(Γ′) ≥ k, since then Γ
is a minimum cost spanning network for S in w and hence we have c(S) =
w(Γ) = k = n(w, S)−1. So, let Γ′ be a spanning tree for S. Define, for every
i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, Γi := Γ
′ ∩ {l ∈ E : l ⊆ Ci, w(l) = 0}. Since Γ
′, and hence Γi,
does not contain cycles we have |Γi| ≤ |Ci|−1 for every i ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Write
Γ′ = L0 ∪ L1 where L0 := {l ∈ Γ′ : w(l) = 0} and L1 := {l ∈ Γ′ : w(l) = 1}.







|Ci| − (k + 1) = |S|+ 1− (k + 1) = |S| − k.
Therefore
w(Γ′) = |L1| = |Γ′| − |L0| = |S| − |L0| ≥ k.
Example 3 Consider the complete weighted graph < N ′, w > with N ′ =
{0, . . . , 8} and simple cost function w specified by {l ∈ E : w(l) = 0} =
{01, 23, 24, 34, 45, 67}. Let c be the corresponding mcst game. The edges















Figure 4: The cost function of Example 3.
{8} are all (w,N)-components. Therefore c(N) = n(w,N)− 1 = 4− 1 = 3.
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If we consider for example coalition S = {2, 3, 5, 6} we get that {0}, {2, 3},
{5} and {6} are all (w, S)-components. Therefore we also have c(S) =
n(w, S)− 1 = 4− 1 = 3.
In order to show that a mcst game corresponding to a simple cost func-
tion has a pmas we need some more notation. A bijection π : {1, . . . , n} →
{1, . . . , n} is called a permutation of N = {1, . . . , n}. The set of all permuta-
tions of N is denoted by PN . If w is a simple cost function, S ∈ 2N\{∅} and
i ∈ S then the (w, S)-component to which i belongs is denoted by Ci(w, S).
Definition 2 Let w be a simple cost function and let π ∈ PN . The vector




0 if 0 ∈ Ci(w, S)
0 if 0 /∈ Ci(w, S) and π(i) = min
j∈Ci(w,S)
π(j)
1 if 0 /∈ Ci(w, S) and π(i) = min
j∈Ci(w,S)
π(j)
for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}, i ∈ S.
The vector xπ,w provides for every coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} a division of the cost
c(S) in the following way: all members of the (w, S)-component containing
the source 0 do not have to pay anything whereas the (unit) cost of all other
(w, S)-components is allocated to the member in the component with the
lowest index according to π.
Example 4 Consider the simple cost function w of Example 3 and let π ∈
PN be given by π(1) = 2, π(2) = 7, π(3) = 5, π(4) = 3, π(5) = 6, π(6) = 8,













N,8 = 1. Moreover, for S = {2, 3, 5, 6} we get x
π,w






In the following lemma we prove that the vector xπ,w is a pmas for the mcst
game corresponding to simple cost function w.
Lemma 3 Let w be a simple cost function, c the corresponding mcst game,
and π ∈ PN . Then xπ,w is a pmas for c.
Proof Let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. Every (w, S)-component which does not contain





S,i = n(w, S)− 1 = c(S).
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Now let i ∈ N and S, T ∈ 2N\{∅} be such that i ∈ S ⊂ T . In order to show
that xπ,wS,i ≥ x
π,w
T,i it suffices to show that x
π,w
T,i = 1 implies x
π,w
S,i = 1. So,








Therefore xπ,wS,i = 1.
As a corollary we get the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 2 Every mcst game has a pmas.
Proof The theorem follows directly from Theorem 1, Lemma 3 and the
observation that if x1 = (x1S,i)S∈2N\{∅},i∈S is a pmas for c
1 and x2 =
(x2S,i)S∈2N\{∅},i∈S for c
2 then αx1 + βx2 := (αx1S,i + βx
2
S,i)S∈2N\{∅},i∈S is
a pmas for αc1 + βc2 for every α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0.
5 Algorithms
Two famous algorithms for the determination of a minimum cost spanning
tree are the algorithm of Prim (Prim (1957)) and the algorithm of Kruskal
(Kruskal (1956)). In order to describe both algorithms briefly let w be an
cost function and let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. A minimum cost spanning tree for S can
be obtained in the following two ways.
Prim’s Algorithm: In the first step form an edge of minimal
cost between a node in S and the source 0. In every subsequent
step form an edge of minimal cost between a node in S which
is not connected yet with the source, directly or indirectly, and
the source or with a node in S which is already connected with
the source, directly or indirectly. In every step of the algorithm
there is precisely one node in S which gets a connection with the
source, so the algorithm stops after precisely |S| steps.
Kruskal’s Algorithm: In the first step form an edge between
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nodes in S ∪{0} of minimal cost. In every subsequent step form
an edge between nodes in S ∪ {0} of minimal cost which does
not form a cycle with the edges which have already been formed.
The algorithm also stops after precisely |S| steps.
The algorithm of Prim has proven its use in cost allocation. If one assigns
the cost of an edge, which is formed in some step of the algorithm, to
the player who gets a connection with the source, directly or indirectly, in
that same step then one obtains a core element of the corresponding mcst
game (see Bird (1976) for more details). In the following example we will
demonstrate that such a procedure does not necessarily generate a pmas of
the corresponding mcst game.
Example 5 Consider the complete weighted graph < N ′, w > with N ′ =




























Figure 5: The cost function of Example 5.
algorithm for N = {1, 2, 3} yields the formation of edge 01 first, followed by
the formation of edge 13 and edge 23. The cost of edge 01 is assigned to
player 1, the cost of edge 13 to player 3 and the cost of edge 23 to player
2. Following the same procedure for all other coalitions we get the following
table
S 1 2 3
123 6 8 13
12 6 17 ∗
13 6 ∗ 13
23 ∗ 17 8
1 6 ∗ ∗
2 ∗ 17 ∗
3 ∗ ∗ 18
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This table does not provide a pmas of the corresponding mcst game: in
coalition S = {2, 3} player 3 has to pay 8 which is strictly less than the
amount 13 which he has to pay in the larger coalition N = {1, 2, 3}.
A basis for an algorithm that finds a pmas in any mcst game is provided by
Theorem 1 and Lemma 3. First decompose a cost function w withCa(w) = ∅
as a positive combination of simple cost functions w1, . . . , wk, with a strictly





Theorem 1 tells us that the same decomposition is true for the mcst games





Subsequently, fix some permutation π ∈ PN . Compute, for every i ∈
{1, . . . , k} the vector xπ,wi . According to Lemma 3 the vector xπ,wi is a






is a pmas for mcst game c. For the sake of completeness note that for
w = 0 the vector xπ,w := 0 is a pmas for the corresponding minimum cost
spanning tree game c = 0. An alternative way of describing this algorithm
is the following.
Subtraction Algorithm for the computation of a pmas of a
mcst game.
Initialisation: Let < N ′, w > be a complete weighted graph and let
π ∈ PN . Define x = {xS,i}S∈2N\{∅},i∈S by xS,i := 0
for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}, i ∈ S.
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Algorithm: WHILE w = 0
DO α := min{w(l) : l ∈ E,w(l)> 0}
for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}, i ∈ S:
IF 0 /∈ Ci(w, S) and
π(i) = minj∈Ci(w,S) π(j)
THEN xS,i := xS,i + α
END
for every l ∈ E with w(l) > 0:
w(l) := w(l)− α
END
In the following example we illustrate the Subtraction Algorithm.
Example 6 Consider the complete weighted graph of Example 5 and let
π ∈ PN be given by π(i) = i for every i ∈ N . In every step of the Subtraction
Algorithm some of the coefficients xS,i will be raised by some amount α.
Which coefficients xS,i will be raised? Coefficient xS,i will be raised if there
is no path in S ∪ {0} of zero cost from i to source 0 (0 /∈ Ci(w, S)), and
if there is no path in S ∪ {0} of zero cost from i to some node j ∈ S with
π(j) < π(i).
In the first step of the algorithm α = 6, the cost of edge 01. Since all edges
have positive cost all coefficients xS,i will be raised by 6. At the end of step
1 the cost of every edge will be lowered by 6, so w(01) = 0.
In the second step of the algorithm α = 2, the cost of edge 23. Since edge
10 is a path from 1 to source 0 of cost zero all coefficients xS,1 with 1 ∈ S
will not be raised in this step (and in subsequent) steps, whereas all other
coefficients are raised by 2. At the end of step 2 the cost of every edge with
positive cost will be lowered by 2, so w(23) = w(01) = 0.
In the third step of the algorithm α = 5, the cost of edge 13. Since edge
32 is a path of zero cost which connects player 3 with player 2, which has
a lower index according to π (π(2) < π(3)), the coefficients x123,3 and x23,3
will not be raised in this and further steps. All coefficients, which remain to
be raised, are increased by 5 and at the end of step 3 the cost of every edge
with positive cost will be lowered by 5, so w(13) = w(23) = w(01) = 0.
In step 4 we have α = 4, the cost of edge 02. Since player 2 is (w, 123)-
connected with the source, via path 23, 31, 10, and player 3 is (w, 13)-
connected with the source, via path 31, 10, the corresponding coefficients
will not be raised anymore, whereas all coefficients, which remain to be
raised, are increased by 4. At the end of step 4 the cost of every edge with
positive cost will be lowered by 4, so w(02) = w(13) = w(23) = w(01) = 0.
14
In step 5 we have α = 1, the cost of edge 03. Since edge 20 is a path from
2 to source 0 of zero cost the coefficients x12,2, x23,2, and x2,2 will not be
raised any further. The only coefficient, which remains to be raised, x3,3, is
increased by 1. At the end of step 5 every edge with positive cost is lowered
by 1, so w(02) = 0.
In step 6 we have α = 3, the cost of edge 12. Since edge 30 is a path from
3 to source 0 of zero cost coefficient x3,3 will not be raised anymore. The
cost of the only edge with positive cost, edge 12, is lowered by 3 and the
algorithm stops. The pmas of the corresponding mcst game, created in the
Subtraction Algorithm, is given by
S 1 2 3
123 6 6 + 2+ 5 6 + 2
12 6 6 + 2+ 5 + 4 ∗
13 6 ∗ 6 + 2 + 5
23 ∗ 6 + 2+ 5 + 4 6 + 2
1 6 ∗ ∗
2 ∗ 6 + 2+ 5 + 4 ∗
3 ∗ ∗ 6 + 2+ 5 + 4 + 1
=
S 1 2 3
123 6 13 8
12 6 17 ∗
13 6 ∗ 13
23 ∗ 17 8
1 6 ∗ ∗
2 ∗ 17 ∗
3 ∗ ∗ 18
Note that this scheme coincides with the one in Example 5, except for the
coefficients x123,2 and x123,3, which have been interchanged. Note moreover
that player 2 in coalition {1, 2, 3} has to pay the cost of edge 13, although
he does not belong to this edge.
In every step of the Subtraction Algorithm a multiple of a simple cost
function is subtracted from cost function w. Moreover, the same multiple
of the pmas of the mcst game corresponding to this simple cost function is
added to table x.
Remark Consider a complete weighted graph < N ′, w > where, in order
to simplify arguments, all edges have different positive cost. Let π ∈ PN
and let xπ,w be the pmas generated by the Subtraction Algorithm. Let
y = (xπ,wN,i )i∈N be the corresponding core allocation for the grand coalition
N . Moreover, let Γ = {l1, . . . , ln} be the unique minimum cost spanning
tree for N with w(l1) < w(l2) < · · · < w(ln). So, according to Kruskal’s
Algorithm, edge l1 forms in the first step, edge l2 in the second step, etcetera.
Let i1 ∈ N be the unique player which is connected via network Γ1 = {l1}
with the source 0 or with some node j ∈ N with π(j) < π(i1), let i2 be the
unique player in N\{i1} which is connected via network Γ2 = {l1, l2} with
the source 0 or with some node j ∈ N with π(j) < π(i2), etcetera. Note
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that in Example 6 we have l1 = 01, l2 = 23, l3 = 13, and i1 = 1, i2 = 3
and i3 = 2. One easily verifies that yik = w(lk) for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Stated differently, the Subtraction Algorithm allocates the cost of an edge
which forms in some step of Kruskal’s Algorithm to the player which gets a
connection with the source or with a player with a lower index according to
π.
6 Variants of mcst games
In this final section we will consider some variants of minimum cost spanning
tree games. One variant is the class of monotonic minimum cost spanning
tree games which are characterized by the fact that coalitions are allowed
to use networks which contain nodes outside the coalition. Two other vari-
ants are obtained by considering directed weighted graphs. Here the aim of
coalitions is to construct a directed network such that every player in the
coalition is connected with the source via a directed path. This approach
leads to the class of directed minimum cost spanning tree games and mono-
tonic directed minimum cost spanning tree games. For any of these new
classes of games we will present an example that does not have a pmas.
However, for special cases of directed networks Moretti et al. (2001) have
established existence of a pmas.
First we consider the class of monotonic minimum cost spanning tree
games.
Definition 3 Let < N ′, w > be a complete weighted graph. Themonotonic
minimum cost spanning tree game (N, cmon), corresponding to < N ′, w >, is
defined by
cmon(S) = min{w(Γ) : Γ is a spanning network for some coalition T ⊇ S}
for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
In the following example we present a monotonic minimum cost spanning
tree game without a pmas.
Example 7 Consider the complete weighted graph < N ′, w > with N ′ =
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and cost function w as depicted in figure 6. All edges which
are depicted have cost 1, whereas all other edges have cost 10. A minimum
cost spanning tree for S = {1, 2, 3} is {04, 05, 14, 24, 35} so cmon(123) = 5.





























Figure 6: The cost function of Example 7.
In a similar way one gets cmon(13) = cmon(23) = 3. If cmon has a pmas
{xS,i}S∈2N\{∅},i∈S then
10 = 2cmon(123)
= 2(x123,1+ x123,2 + x123,3)
≤ x12,1 + x13,1 + x12,2 + x23,2 + x13,3 + x23,3
= x12,1 + x12,2 + x13,1 + x13,3 + x23,2 + x23,3
= cmon(12) + cmon(13) + cmon(23)
= 9,
which yields a contradiction.
In order to provide the definition of directed minimum cost spanning tree
games and monotonic directed minimum cost spanning tree games we need
some more terminology. A complete directed weighted graph is a tuple
< N ′, w > where
i) N ′ = {0, 1, . . . , n};
ii) w : D → IR+, where D = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N ′, i = j}.
Elements of D are called directed arcs. A directed path from i to j in network
Γ ⊆ D is a sequence of nodes i = i0, i1, . . . , ik = j such that (is, is+1) ∈ Γ
for every s ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}. Network Γ is a spanning network for S (S ⊆ N)
if for every (i, j) ∈ Γ we have {i, j} ⊆ S ∪ {0} and if for every i ∈ S there is
a directed path in Γ from i to 0.
Definition 4 Let < N ′, w > be a complete directed weighted graph. The
directed minimum cost spanning tree game (N, c), corresponding to< N ′, w >,
is defined by
c(S) = min{w(Γ) : Γ is a spanning network for S}
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for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}, whereas the monotonic directed minimum cost span-
ning tree game (N, cmon), corresponding to < N ′, w >, is defined by
cmon(S) = min{w(Γ) : Γ is a spanning network for some coalition T ⊇ S}
for every S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
We conclude this section with two examples which show that directed mini-
mum cost spanning tree games and monotonic directed minimum cost span-
ning tree games do not necessarily have a pmas.
Example 8 Consider the complete directed weighted graph< N ′, w > with
N ′ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and cost function w as depicted in figure 7. All
directed arcs which are depicted have cost 0 whereas all other directed arcs










































Figure 7: The cost function of Example 8.
corresponding to < N ′, w >, and suppose that x = {xS,i}S∈2N\{∅},i∈S is a
pmas for c. A minimum cost spanning network for N is obtained by taking
all directed arcs with cost 0 and directed arc (1, 0). So c(123456) = 1. Now
consider S = {1, 3, 4}. We have
2 = c(134) = x134,1 + x134,3 + x134,4
≤ x14,1 + x3,3 + x14,4
= x14,1 + x14,4+ x3,3
= c(14) + c(3)
= 1 + 1 = 2,
and hence x134,3 = x3,3 = c(3) = 1. Since also c(13) = c(4) = 1 we
get in a similar way that x134,4 = 1. Therefore x134,1 = c(134)− x134,3 −
x134,4 = 0 and hence, by population monotonicity, xN,1 ≤ x134,1 = 0. By
considering respectively coalitions 234, 356, 456, 512 and 612 we get via
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analogous arguments that the numbers xN,2, . . . , xN,6 are all nonpositive.
This contradicts however that
∑
i∈N xN,i = c(N) = 1.
Example 9 Consider the complete directed weighted graph< N ′, w > with
N ′ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and cost function w as depicted in figure 8. All
directed arcs which are depicted have cost 0, whereas all other directed arcs
































Figure 8: The cost function of Example 9.
tree game corresponding to < N ′, w >. A minimum cost spanning network
for S = {1, 2, 3} is {(1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 5), (4, 0), (5, 0)} so cmon(123) = 2. A
minimum cost spanning network for S = {1, 2} is {(1, 4), (2, 4), (4, 0)} so
cmon(12) = 1. In a similar way one gets cmon(13) = cmon(23) = 1. Since
2cmon(123) > cmon(12) + cmon(13) + cmon(23) we conclude in a similar way as
in Example 7 that cmon has no pmas.
In Moretti et al. (2001) a special subclass of directed minimum cost spanning
tree problems is considered, which show up in considering the problem of
connecting houses in the mountains with a water purifier. It is shown that
the games corresponding to these problems always have a pmas.
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